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ABSTRACT
Much evidence suggests individuals di¤er in their predisposition to cooperate, which
is essentially a component of human capital. This paper examines the role of individual
cooperative tendencies and their interactions with institutions in generating social trust; it
also endogenizes cooperative tendencies using a human capital investment model. Multiple
equilibria and ine¢ ciencies exist due to positive externalities. An innovative nding is
that, when institutions are more e¤ective in punishing defecting behaviors, more people
invest in cooperative tendencies and hence the endogenous social trust is higher, though the
equilibrium cooperative tendencies are lower. This paper provides a plausible explanation
for many empirical and experimental results. (JEL: Z13, J24)
1 Introduction
The importance of social trust in economy was suggested long ago by Arrow [1972]. In
recent years social trust has attracted the attention of many economists as well as other
social scientists.1 For example, several empirical studies show that the average trust level
in a society is signicantly associated with economic growth (Knack and Keefer [1997])
and has large positive e¤ects on the performance of various organizations (La Porta et
al. [1997]). At the same time, many experimental economists have documented substantial
amounts of trust in various games (see Palfrey and Prisbrey [1997], Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe [1995], and Glaeser et al. [2000] among others). The formal analysis
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: huang@smu.edu.sg; tel.: 65-68280859; fax: 65-68280833.
The author is grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions.
1Social trust is considered an important form of social capital, which represents the cooperative infrastruc-
ture of a society (Coleman [1988], Putnam [1993], [1995]).
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of social trust, however, is lagging behind, and answers to many basic questions about
social trust are still elusive (James [2002]). For example, what is the relationship between
trustworthiness, trust, and social trust? Where does social trust come from? Is its level
e¢ cient? How is it related to human capital? This paper attempts to answer these questions
using a human capital investment approach in a game theoretic setting.
To induce voluntary cooperation in prisoners dilemmas, the conventional way in eco-
nomics is to embed a dilemma in a bigger game with repeated interactions, where the
potential gains from future dealings motivate people to cooperate in a seemingly one-shot
prisoners dilemma. In real life, however, this kind of shadow of future(Axelrod [1984])
generated by expected future dealings with other players is often too vague to have strong
enough disciplines against defecting in the game or situation studied. For example, when a
person nds a lost wallet containing some cash on the sidewalk in New York City, the gains
from future interactions with the wallet owner are not likely to be large enough to prompt
one to return the wallet; yet among hundreds of such lost wallets more than half of them
were returned with the cash intact (Frank [1992]). In these occasions shrewd calculative
thinking is rendered less helpful, whereas personal character cultivated from socialization
and moral training may o¤er a more reliable guide for actions.
It is a mundane observation that some people are simply more trustworthy than oth-
ers: they are more inclined to help others at their own costs and less likely to shirk their
responsibilities. Abundant evidence from experiments suggests people, in general, di¤er
in predisposition to cooperate (Palfrey and Prisbrey [1997], Andreoni and Croson
[2008]). Extensive research in industrial and organization psychology demonstrates that
an individuals conscientiousness, a reliable and consistent dimension of personality, relates
strongly to job performance across di¤erent types of jobs (Judge and Ilies [2002]). Studies
of moral development demonstrate that such pro-social attitudes develop a functional au-
tonomy over time and become distinct from short-term calculations of self-interest (Staub
[1978]). The daily life usage of trust, as reected in the dictionary denitions, also focuses
on the trusted persons essential integrity and character, rather than on whether she has
external incentives to refrain from taking advantage of others. For example, Websters New
Collegiate Dictionary [1979, p. 1246] denes trust as assured reliance on the character,
ability, strength, or truth of someone or something.
All of these facts and studies point to a distinct way for players to reach cooperation
in one-period prisoners dilemmas: some players have acquired a certain type of trait or
skill that enables them to resist short-run opportunistic temptations and to cooperate for
mutual gains (Frank [1987], Kandel and Lazear [1992], Rotemberg [1994], Kreps
[1997]). Such a stable personal trait, which is called in this paper the cooperative tendency
of a player, can be interpreted as a credible commitment to do general good. It is essentially
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a component of human capital that is costly to cultivate but yields a stream of returns in
the future. When more people have higher cooperative tendencies in a society, they are
more trustworthy and hence social trust is higher. How many people choose to inculcate
cooperative tendencies and at what levels are likely to be a¤ected by the costs and returns
of cultivation, which may vary across society and over time.
These insights are formalized in this paper. When we x a one-period prisoners
dilemma, players with cooperative tendencies below a certain threshold behave like a self-
ish type who always defects; those with high enough cooperative tendencies, in contrast,
behave as a seless type who always cooperates; while those with middle level cooperative
tendencies behave as a reciprocal type who makes in-kind responses to her partners ac-
tion.2 The latter two types, jointly called the cooperative type, resemble the irrational types
typically assumed in reputation literature, where the honest players (Tirole [1996] and
Dixit [2003]) correspond to the seless type here, the tit-for-tat (Kreps et al. [1982]) and
the reciprocal players (Fehr and Gachter [2000]) correspond to the reciprocal type here.
These various ad hoc types are now naturally unied and rationalized in this paper in that
their behaviors, though seemingly irrational and mechanic, are actually rational responses of
players with di¤erent levels of cooperative tendencies. And players with higher cooperative
tendencies are more likely to behave as a cooperative type than others. Furthermore, the
same player with a xed cooperative tendency may exhibit all three behavior types across
di¤erent games, where her probability of behaving as a cooperative type is higher when the
defecting benets are lower.
Now we can dene the trust-related concepts. The trustworthiness of a player in a game
is the probability that she would cooperate in it, which obviously depends on her cooperative
tendency, the payo¤s of defecting in the game, and the institutional background. How
much trust a player has in her partner is equal to the latters perceived trustworthiness.
Social trust in a group is equal to the perceived trustworthiness of a typical member or
the average trustworthiness of all members, which is often characterized by the proportion
of cooperative players in the group. The level of social trust is thus determined by the
distribution of cooperative tendency in the group and the specic game features, which is
why it varies across players and games (Glaeser et al. [2000]). This formalization of trust
based on individual cooperative tendencies seems fruitful, since it not only unies various
ad hoc behavioral types widely adopted in reputation literature, but also systematically
accounts for related empirical and experimental results.
The next step is to study how cooperative tendencies are acquired by individuals. The
cultivation process is modeled in this paper as a human capital investment decision where
2Many experimental studies have found that between 40% and 66% of subjects exhibit cooperative or
reciprocal behaviors, while between 20% and 30% act completely selsh (Fehr and Gachter [2000]).
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parents choose the optimal level of cooperative tendency for their child to maximize her
lifetime income minus the inculcation cost. We nd that the individual returns of investing
in cooperative tendencies are always lower than the social returns, since an individuals
investment changes others beliefs about future social trust and thus produces positive
externalities. As a result, there exist multiple equilibria where the social trust levels are
typically not optimal. When the net returns are quite similar among individuals, a negligible
di¤erence in initial beliefs may lead the economy to either no trustor full truststable
equilibrium; this may account for why otherwise similar communities may end up with very
di¤erent levels of social trust (Putnam [1993]). When individual returns are diverse enough,
the economy may have a unique stable equilibrium, where more people invest in cooperative
tendencies if the information structure is better (so that ones cooperative tendency can be
assessed more accurately), or if disciplinary institutions that punish defecting behaviors are
more e¤ective; the individual cooperative tendencies in the equilibrium, however, are lower
since the relative temptation of defecting is lower.
This paper belongs to the burgeoning literature of social trust. For an important and
complex concept such as social trust, there are naturally many di¤erent angles to investigate,
each providing some new insights. For example, one may analyze social capital formation
using the method of physical capital accumulation (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote
[2002]), or study how incentive structures in a rm a¤ect social trust among employees (Rob
and Zemsky [2002]). This paper explores a new perspective, namely the human capital
approach, in understanding social trust and its formation. In addition to many ndings
consistent with existing empirical and experimental evidence, it yields new results that
advance the social trust literature. For example, this paper illustrates the importance of
strategic interdependence among individual decisions in cultivating cooperative tendencies,
which sheds new light on cross-sectional di¤erences in social trust. Though the crowding
in and crowding out e¤ects of legal institutions on intrinsic motivation are already known
(Huck [1998], Bar-Gill and Fershtman [2005], Bohnet, Frey, and Huck [2001],
Guth and Ockenfels [2005]), this papers nding that a more e¤ective legal system may
induce more people to invest in lower cooperative tendencies is brand new; this result is
also consistent with the evidence that nations with better legal institutions tend to have
higher social trust levels based on the World Value Surveys (Knack and Keefer [1997]).
Related literature studies the endogeneity of moral preferences using the indirect evo-
lutionary approach, which combines individual rational decision-making guided by a given
preference with the evolutionary approach of preference determination (e.g. Güth, Kliemt,
and Peleg [2000], Brennan, Güth, and Kliemt [2003], Güth and Ockenfels [2005]).
Specically, the proportion of people with preferences containing a certain intrinsic motiva-
tional parameter increases in the population automatically if their relative material payo¤s
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are higher than those without it. The human capital investment approach in the current
paper, however, treats the preference formation process itself as a rational choice, too, al-
beit not by the individual herself whose preference is to be determined, but by her parents
aiming to maximize her lifetime material payo¤s minus the inculcation cost. It implies that,
even when players with cooperative preferences earn higher incomes than those without,
their equilibrium proportion may not increase to one due to positive inculcation costs, and
it may even drop to zero if it is too costly to inculcate such preferences. Such a prediction
di¤ers from the costless evolution approach of preferences. Nonetheless, the two approaches
do share a fundamental element that the prevalence of cooperative preferences in a pop-
ulation positively correlates with the associated material gains. In terms of methodology,
one can view the rational investment approach as a generalized model, with the indirect
evolutionary approach as a special case with zero inculcation cost.3
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section cooperative tendency and social
trust are formally dened and investigated in various games. A simple human capital
investment model is developed in Section 3, where an individuals cooperative tendency
is chosen (by her parents) to maximize her lifetime income given the others investment
decisions. The nal section presents conclusions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Cooperative Tendencies and Social Trust
2.1 The Basic Setup
There is a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Agents are randomly paired to play
the following one-shot game,
player i
player j
C D
C (g; g) ( l ; g + d  j)
D (g + d  i; l) ( i; j)
where C is cooperate or exert e¤ort, D is defect or do not exert e¤ort, and g; l; and d are
payo¤s from material outputs. We assume
d < l; (1)
g + d  l > 0; (2)
which are quite standard in the relevant literature.4
3 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
4See, for example, Kreps et al [1982], Rotemberg [1994], Bar-Gill and Fershtman [2005] and Dixit
[2003].
5
Besides the game-specic payo¤s specied by (g; l; d), each player i also incurs an idio-
syncratic psychological cost i 2 R+ when she defects; i acts as an internal penalty against
defecting and hence measures player is cooperative tendency.5 Players have heterogenous
cooperative tendencies such that i  F (), where F () is a continuous and strictly in-
creasing function. When i = j = 0, the game is a typical prisoners dilemma. To avoid
confusion and be consistent with the standard usage in the literature, we call a game a
prisoners dilemma if it is so for players with zero cooperative tendency.
When individual cooperative tendencies are publicly observed, it is straightforward to
get the following result: a player always defects (as a selsh type) if i < d, always co-
operates (as a seless type) if i  l, and makes in-kind responses to her partners action
(as a reciprocal type) if i 2 [d; l). The trustworthiness of a player in the game is the
probability that she would cooperate in it. Selsh players have zero trustworthiness since
they never cooperate; by contrast, seless players are completely trustworthy. A reciprocal
player exhibits zero trustworthiness if her partner is (perceived) selsh, and full trustwor-
thiness if otherwise. How much trust a player has in her partner is equal to the latters
(perceived) trustworthiness. So no one trusts a selsh partner, whereas everyone trusts a
seless one. A cooperative player will trust a reciprocal partner, but a selsh player will
not. Social trust in this game is equal to the average trustworthiness of all players, which
is 1   F (l) + (1   F (d))(F (l)   F (d)) when the matching is random among players, and
1  F (d) when cooperative players match among themselves.
2.2 Trust Among Strangers: Cooperative Tendencies and Disciplinary
Institutions
Suppose cooperative tendencies are private information and players randomly match to
play the above game for one period. There are disciplinary institutions such as the legal
system or monitoring schemes in organizations, which detect the defecting behaviors with
probability q 2 [0; 1], and assign zero material return to players caught defecting and also
to their partners. When one player defects and the other cooperates, this punishes the
defector since it conscates her return g + d from the game and gives l to the cooperator
to compensate her loss, where l < g+ d under assumption (2); when both players defect, it
does not change anything since both get zero return anyway. Let  denote the proportion
of cooperative players in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the one-period incomplete information game, every player cooperates in
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium when q  d=(g+ d); when q < d=(g+ d), the Bayesian Nash
5Modeling a cooperative tendency as an intrinsic benet of cooperation does not make any di¤erence for
the results. A similar motivational parameter is used by, among others, Rob and Zemsky [2002], Brennan,
Güth, and Kliemt [2003] and Güth and Ockenfels [2005].
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equilibrium is players with i   cooperate and others defect,where
  d+ (1  )l   q((g + d  l) + l); (3)
and   Pr(i  ) is unique and stable with @=@d < 0; @=@l < 0; and @=@q > 0.
This proposition shows that when the punishment imposed by the disciplinary insti-
tutions is large enough, that is, when q  d=(g + d), the extrinsic incentives alone can
induce cooperation from all players, regardless of their individual cooperative tendencies.
But such a situation is often very costly to reach since detecting defecting behaviors and
enforcing the punishment scheme uses valuable resources. Substantial costs may be saved
if the general public has certain levels of cooperative tendencies. For an extreme example,
when all players have a cooperative tendency   d, they will choose to cooperate out of
intrinsic incentives alone and hence there is no need for any disciplinary institutions. For
a more general example, suppose  proportion of players have a cooperative tendency 
while the others have zero cooperative tendency, where  2 (0; d+ (1  )l). To achieve a
social trust level of , the society needs to establish institutions with the minimum degree
of punishment
q(; ) =
d+ (1  )l   
(g + d) + (1  )l ;
which is derived from (3) by setting  = ; it is straightforward to see that q(; ) decreases
in both  and : In other words, the extrinsic incentives imposed by institutions and the
intrinsic incentives represented by playerscooperative tendencies are substitutes to each
other in determining the social trust level.
Note that  denotes the minimum cooperative tendency for a player to behave coopera-
tively in this game. Proposition 1 implies that under incomplete information, a player with
i <  behaves as a selsh type, i 2 [; (1  q)l) reciprocal, and i  (1  q)l seless (who
cooperates even when  = 0). The social trust, the expected trustworthiness of a typical
member in this game, is thus characterized by  = 1   F (), the proportion of cooper-
ative players. It is higher when the e¤ectiveness of disciplinary institutions (q) is higher,
when more players have higher cooperative tendencies, when the benet of cooperation g
is higher, and when the costs of cooperation d and l are lower. So social trust varies across
players, games, and institutional backgrounds.
Such a social trust concept coincides with the commonly used trust measure in experi-
ments, the proportion of players who cooperate in a prisoners dilemma. It is also consistent
with the widely used indicator TRUSTC , which measures the percentage of respondents in
a community C replying most people can be trusted(to the question in the World Values
Surveys Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
cant be too careful in dealing with people?), if individuals who have met a trustworthy
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partner agree that most people can be trusted, or those who say so are likely to cooperate
themselves (Glaeser et al. [2000]): In the one-period incomplete information game studied
above, exactly  proportion of players are matched with a trustworthy partner, and  pro-
portion of players cooperate in the game. In other words, if the players who have played the
above game are asked the same trust question as in the World Values Survey, the two trust
measures are likely to coincide. Our nding that trust may di¤er across players, games,
and countries can thus account for the commonly observed discrepancies between survey-
and experiment-based measures of social trust (Palfrey and Prisbrey [1997], Glaeser
et al. [2000], Burlando and Hey [1997], Weimann [1994]), since the distribution of
cooperative tendencies, game features, and the e¤ectiveness of disciplinary institutions are
likely to vary across games and real life situations.
2.3 Trust Among Acquaintances: Cooperative Tendencies and Repeated
Interactions
When the legal system is not available or too expensive to operate, repeated social inter-
actions may serve as an informal disciplinary institution to discourage defecting. Suppose
players are randomly paired to play the above stage game for more than one period; at
the end of each period a players action is observed by her partner, and there is a positive
probability   1 that they will play the game for another period. Each pair lasts at most
T periods, where T is a nite integer.6 The probability  that the game continues measures
the strength of the social network such as a residential community, a club, or other social
organizations where people may interact with each other for more than one occasion.
Suppose the minimum cooperative tendency of the players is l 2 [0; d). A sequen-
tial equilibrium in this game is characterized below to illustrate the interactions between
cooperative tendencies and repeated interactions in determining the social trust level. In
this equilibrium all players cooperate until the last period, when they behave according to
Proposition 1; let 0 = 1 F (0d+ (1  0)l) denote the proportion of cooperative players
determined by (3) with q = 0, and R = F (l)   F (0d + (1   0)l) denote the proportion
of reciprocal players.
Proposition 2 In the T-period game, the following strategy prole plus belief system is a
sequential equilibrium when
l + R(g + d) > d: (4)
The strategy prole is: (i) Players with   l are seless who always play C. (ii) Players
with  2 [0d+ (1  0)l; l) are reciprocal, who play C in the rst period, play C if (C;C)
is played in the previous period, and play D otherwise. (iii) All the other players are of
6An innitely repeated game brings similar insights and hence is not discussed here.
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selsh type, who mimic reciprocal players until the last period when they play D. The belief
system is: (i) In the rst period and every period following the history in which only (C;C)
has been played, every player believes that with probability 0 her partner is a cooperative
type. (ii) In all the following periods after the rst time D is observed, the player who has
played D is believed to be a selsh type; the player who has played C is still believed to be a
cooperative type with probability 0.
Condition (4) suggests that cooperation is more likely when the minimum cooperative
tendency l in the community is higher, when there are more reciprocal players (so that
R is larger), and when the possibility of future encounters, ; is higher. It points to
two di¤erent sources of cooperation: One is trust based on players intrinsic cooperative
tendencies, the other is the reputation e¤ects as represented by R(g + d), which are
obviously substitutes to each other.
The role of a players intrinsic cooperative tendency in achieving cooperation is often
conveniently hidden under the assumption of irrational types, which actually are rational
responses of players with certain levels of cooperative tendencies. For example, tit-for-tat
players in Kreps et al. [1982] and the reciprocal ones in Fehr and Gachter [2000] act
similarly as our reciprocal type players with  2 [0d + (1   0)l; l), and the honest types
in Tirole [1996] and Dixit [2003] act like seless players with   l. These cooperation-
enhancing behavioral types can be unied and systematically analyzed in our framework
using a single concept of cooperative tendency.
The external rewards and punishments contingent on past behaviors may make coopera-
tion appealing to players with low or even zero cooperative tendencies. Such a reputation ef-
fect, however, can not be generated by repeated interactions alone in nitely repeated games;
note that without enough reciprocal players (i.e. if condition (4) R  (d   l)=(g + d)
does not hold), the reputation e¤ect vanishes immediately and hence selsh players would
never cooperate. The e¤ects of cooperative tendencies, however, can be greatly amplied
by repeated interactions, where a few cooperative players may act as a powerful lever to
induce many selsh players to cooperate.
3 The Formation of Cooperative Tendencies
In this section, a players cooperative tendency is endogenized as an equilibrium result of
parental investment in children. The disciplinary institutions are the same as in Section
2.2, which detect any defecting behaviors with probability q 2 [0; 1], and then assign zero
material return to both players.
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3.1 The Basic Model
Each player lives for two periods. The rst period is the investment stage where each
players cooperative tendency is chosen (by her parents) to maximize her life-time income
minus the investment cost, taking as given the expected proportion of cooperative players
 2 [0; 1] in the population.7 Investing in a cooperative tendency  incurs positive costs.
For example, parents have to repeatedly make e¤ort in teaching children to share toys and
be considerate. This task is easier when parents are more skillful and when the child is
more obedient. The cost function is c(; i), where c(0; i) = 0; c > 0; ci > 0; c  0; and
ci  0. That is, the inculcation cost strictly increases and is convex in the cooperative
tendency ; to capture player heterogeneity in the investment cost, it also strictly increases
in player index i.8
The second period is the production stage. With probability 1  p; playerscooperative
tendencies are private information and they randomly match each other to play the one-
period prisoners dilemma characterized by (g; d; l). Recall from Proposition 1 that players
with   () cooperate in this game while the others defect, where
()  d+ (1 )l   q((g + d  l) + l) (5)
is adapted from (3). With probability p, playerscooperative tendencies are observed, and
only those who have high enough cooperative tendencies   D are allowed to play a
one-period prisoners dilemma characterized by (G;D;L), where G  g and D  ().
Such a set-up is chosen to capture real life situations where in some instances we have to
engage with strangers in a one-period prisoners dilemma without knowing their individual
trustworthiness, while in other instances playerscooperative tendencies are revealed so that
we can choose to deal only with those who are known to be trustworthy.9 The fundamental
message conveyed by the model is that the pros and cons of cultivating a cooperative
tendency are not limited in a single game, but balanced throughout the whole lifetime: The
loss of being cheated by a selsh player in one game may be compensated by the benet
7We assume a persons cooperative tendency is xed throughout adulthood, which is consistent with the
fact that her trustworthiness may change across games, partners, and with updated information (Alesina
and La Ferrara [2002]). This was proved in Section 2.
8 It is natural to conjecture that the inculcation cost may be lower when the parentscooperative tendency
is higher due to social learning and imitation at home. Such an inuence is already accommodated in the
cost function c(; i) where the index i can be regarded as negatively correlated with the parentscooperative
tendency, and hence will not a¤ect any Nash equilibrium results. Such parental inuence may, however,
generate di¤erent dynamics in an overlapping-generation framework; see Huang (2006) for an explicit treat-
ment.
9A players cooperative tendency may be correctly detected by others through various ways. For example,
many subtle physical or emotional signals may enable us to distinguish a genuinely trustworthy person
from a pretending one since it is often di¢ cult to completely control these signals (Frank [1987], [1988]).
Information about a players past behaviors may also reveal her innate cooperative tendency (Greif [1989]).
The e¤ectiveness of such type-revealing processes is represented by p in the model.
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of cooperating with a trustworthy partner in another game that may not be related to the
former one.
Lemma 1 i = D if i > 0 for any i 2 [0; 1].
This lemma shows that if a player ever invests, her cooperative tendency will be equal
to D; which just enables her to cooperate in the complete information game (G;D;L). We
assume D = () without much loss of generality. When player i becomes a cooperative
type, her expected lifetime income minus the investment cost is
bV (i;;D) = pG+ (1  p)[g   (1 )(1  q)l]  c((); i); (6)
if she remains a selsh type, no investment cost is incurred, and her expected lifetime income
is bV (i;; 0) = (1  p)(1  q)(g + d): (7)
Let V (i;) represent the net return of investing in () versus remaining selsh:
V (i;)  bV (i;;D)  bV (i;; 0) = pG  (1  p)()  c((); i);
where the rst term is the expected gain of being cooperative, the second term is the
expected loss, and the last one is the investment cost. Players will choose to invest in ()
if and only if V (i;)  0.
Lemma 2 @V (i;)=@i < 0, @V (i;)=@ > 0.
The intuition for this lemma is quite clear. V (i;) decreases with player index i because
the investing cost increases with it. A marginal increase of  not only improves the chance
of meeting a cooperative player, but also reduces the threshold cooperative tendency ()
and hence the investment cost. Since cooperative players benet more from both channels,
the net return V (i;) strictly increases with .
3.2 The Equilibrium
Every Nash Equilibrium (NE thereafter) at the investment stage is characterized by a pair
(; ) where  = , i.e., the expected proportion of cooperative players is equal to the
actual one. Note that no social trust equilibrium ( = 0;  = 0) always exists since
there is no gain for being the only cooperative player. And the equilibrium investment
in cooperative tendency is generally ine¢ cient because an individuals investment decision
brings positive externalities to all players.10 We partition the parameter space into four cases
10Actually the under-investment in appropriate working habits and attitudes has already been felt by
many rms in the U.S., where the current human capital policies focus on cognitive skills to the exclusion of
social skills, self-discipline and a variety of non-cognitive skills that are known to determine success in life
(Cappelli [1995], Heckman [2000]).
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and characterize the corresponding equilibria when the slopes of the best response functions
are monotone. We also check whether these NE s are stable to small perturbations of .11
The Benchmark: The Diverse Cost Case
In the benchmark case, players have quite diverse costs: Some have costs so low that
they would invest in cooperative tendencies no matter how few players are expected to do
so, while others have such high costs that they would not invest even if everybody else does
so. This case is characterized by the following conditions
lim!0+V (0;) > 0; (8)
V (1; 1) < 0: (9)
0 1
1
p
P*p
Figure 1: Equilibrium Social Trust in the Diverse Cost Case
Proposition 3 When players have diverse costs as specied by (8) and (9), there exist
two NEs (0; 0) and (; ), where only (; ) is stable;  is uniquely determined by
V (i(); ) = 0, where @=@p > 0 and @=@q > 0; in contrast, @()=@p < 0 and
@()=@q < 0.
This proposition suggests that when the idiosyncratic di¤erences in the investment cost
outweigh the externalities, players are less a¤ected by other peoples choices and hence the
resulting interior equilibrium  is unique and stable. See Figure 1 for illustration. In
the stable equilibrium, more people invest in cooperative tendencies when it is easier to
11An NE can be reached as a steady state in a dynamic process with innite generations, where the
expected proportion of cooperative players in each following generation is equal to the realized proportion
in the current one, that is, N+1 = N for N = 1; 2; ::: where 1 is exogenously given.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Social Trust in the Medium Cost Case
detect a partners cooperative tendency (p is higher) and when the punishment imposed
by disciplinary institutions is larger (q is higher). In contrast, the equilibrium cooperative
tendency () that is necessary to resist the temptation of defecting is lower when the
institutions are more e¤ective (higher p and q). These results also hold for any interior
stable equilibrium in the other cases discussed below.
Cases with Similar Costs
In contrast to the benchmark case, players may have similar investment costs, which
can be either too high, too low, or in the medium range compared to the returns. In the
Medium Cost Case, the net returns of investing in cooperative tendencies are quite similar
across players, not too high or too low. This case is characterized by
lim!0+V (0;)  0; (10)
V (1; 1)  0; (11)
which are exactly the opposite to (8) and (9) that dene the benchmark case. They imply
that there exist 0 and 1 in (0; 1) such that no players invest when   0, and all do
so when   1. Following similar arguments as in the benchmark, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 When players have medium level costs as specied by (10) and (11), there
are three NEs: (0; 0); (m; m); and (1; 1); where m 2 [0;1]  (0; 1): Among them (0; 0)
and (1; 1) are stable.
This case is illustrated by Figure 2. The interior NE (m; m) is unstable, happening
only when the initial belief is exactly m. A negligible " di¤erence in initial beliefs may
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lead to two polar stable equilibria: If the initial belief is 0:5" lower than m; the economy
will ultimately fall into the no-trusttrap (0; 0). On the contrary, if the initial belief is 0:5"
higher than m; the economy will gradually reach the full-truststate (1; 1). The intuition
is that, when more than m players are expected to invest in cooperative tendencies, the
associated positive externalities outweigh idiosyncratic cost di¤erences and make net returns
positive for everybody, while the opposite is true when people believe that less than m
will do so. In other words, when the inculcation costs are at the medium level and similar
across players, an individuals decision is heavily a¤ected by otherschoices.
In the Low Cost Case, even the highest indexed players invest in cooperative tendencies
when they believe enough people are doing so. It is characterized by conditions (8) and (11).
Here the full trust NE (1; 1) always exists and is stable; it is either the only equilibrium, or
there exist two other NE s at interior points where the one with lower  is stable. The High
Cost Case is dened by (10) and (9), where the no-trust NE (0; 0) is stable and unique.
The proof is omitted since it is similar to the rst two cases. See Figure 3 for illustration.
The following proposition summarizes some common results of these four cases.
0 1
1
0 1
1
p p
PP
Figure 3: Equilibrium Social Trust in the Low and High Cost Cases
Proposition 5 In all the stable interior NEs, social trust strictly increases in p and q,
while the individual cooperative tendencies strictly decrease in p and q.
The Relationship between Extrinsic and Intrinsic Incentives. A cooperative
tendency is an intrinsic discipline against defecting, which is cultivated primarily at home
and school during ones childhood. Extrinsic incentives against defecting are represented
by p and q, which are determined by the information structure and the economic gover-
nance institutions, including the legal system and informal governance methods. The more
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e¤ective these institutions are in punishing defecting behaviors and encouraging coopera-
tion, the higher p and q, which leads to higher social trust in equilibrium; the resulting
cooperative tendency in equilibrium (), however, is lower. That is, higher extrinsic in-
centives induce more people to become cooperative, but with lower cooperative tendencies.
In contrast, when the governance institutions are less e¤ective, people have to invest in
higher cooperative tendencies to achieve cooperation; so fewer people are cooperative, but
the cooperative ones are able to withstand larger temptations. The relationship between
the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives is thus more complex than either being substitutes in
promoting trust, or simply crowding in or crowding out each other.
These results imply that, in a country with more e¤ective disciplinary institutions,
survey-based trust indicator TRUST is higher, whereas the experiment-based social trust
measure may be lower if subjects are faced with quite high defecting benets due to the
lower p and q in the experiments than in real life. It may shed light on the contradictory
social trust ranking across countries. For example, TRUST in the UK (44.4) is much
higher than Italy (26.3) (Knack and Keefer [1997]), but UK subjects free-rode to a
much greater extent than Italians in a public goods experiment (Burlando and Hey
[1997]). A similar comparison is the US (TRUST = 45:4) vs. Germany (TRUST = 29:8)
based on survey results, whereas US subjects free-rode more than Germans in experiments
(Weimann [1994]).
The disciplinary institutions are assumed exogenously given throughout the paper in
order to focus on the role of individual cooperative tendencies and their endogenous for-
mation. The endogeneity of these institutions, however, is readily acknowledged, and some
direct implications of our results on the optimal design of the institutions is briey discussed
below, though a full-edged analysis is best left for future research.12
Lets consider a society in the Medium Cost Case that has reached the full-trust equi-
librium (q) = 1, where q is the initial quality of disciplinary institutions. If the social
planner is not aware of the endogeneity of individual cooperative tendencies, his best ex post
choice of q should be zero, which is obviously not optimal, since it discourages investment
in cooperative tendencies and may actually bring the society to the no-trust equilibrium
in the next generation.13 Similar things could also happen to the Low Cost Case where a
lower ex post q is likely to reduce the social trust level signicantly. The impact of endoge-
nous cooperative tendencies on the optimal design of institutions is less dramatic in the
Diverse Cost Case, though the optimal quality is still higher than the naive best choice due
to 0(q) > 0 by Proposition 3. The only scenario where such endogeneity issues may not
12Some initial attempts are already made in this direction (see, for example, Huck [1997], [1998], andGüth
and Ockenfels [2005]), though most of them adopt an evolutionary approach for preference determination.
13A lower q shifts the best response curve downward in Figure 2 and hence makes the no-trust equilibrium
more likely to happen.
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make any di¤erence on the optimal choice of q is the High Cost Case where nobody ever
invests in cooperative tendencies.
It is also important to note the negative e¤ects of high quality disciplinary institutions
on the equilibrium levels of individual cooperative tendencies. The consequences may be
quite serious if the e¤ectiveness of cultivating cooperative tendencies in children depends on
parentscooperative tendencies; for example, the society may slip into the following vicious
cycle: strict disciplinary institutions lead to lower cooperative tendencies, which then drive
up the cultivation cost, and hence fewer people nd it benecial to inculcate cooperative
tendencies in the next generation; as a result stricter and more costly disciplinary institu-
tions are required to maintain the same level of cooperation as before. In other words, a
society may nd itself depleting its stock of intrinsic motivation and forced to rely exceed-
ingly on extrinsic incentives. So the optimal design of disciplinary institutions should be
combined with that of educational institutions, which, by directly reducing the cultivation
costs, encourage more people to invest in higher cooperative tendencies and hence mitigate
the negative e¤ects of the former on the level of individual cooperative tendencies.
4 Conclusions
Social trust is an important social phenomenon, which has been extensively studied by
social scientists (see for example Cook [2001] and Hardin [2002]). Empirical studies in
the economics literature have shown that it facilitates economic performance at various
levels. This paper formalizes trust-related concepts and studies the formation of individual
cooperative tendencies in society using a model of human capital investment. It provides a
plausible explanation for many empirical and experimental results. It also generates fresh
insights and policy implications about social trust, especially on its relationship with human
capital and economic governance institutions.
This paper nds that more e¤ective governance institutions encourage more people to
become cooperative (hence higher social trust), though they may lead to lower individual
cooperative tendencies. Just as criminal rates could be reduced either by more policing or by
helping poor children acquire pro-social attitudes through Headstart or similar programs
(Garces, Thomas, and Currie [2002]), cooperation can be promoted by establishing
governance institutions or cultivating cooperative tendencies in children both at home and
school. How to achieve an optimal combination of these two sources seems an intriguing
topic for future research. For instance, the e¤ectiveness of legal institutions and monitoring
schemes in rms and organizations may evolve interactively with the distribution of coop-
erative tendency in society and result in di¤erent combinations of extrinsic and intrinsic
incentives across societies and over time. Huang [2006], for example, uses a similar version
of the human capital approach developed in this paper to study the dynamic interactions
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between monitoring and trust in a principal-agent setting with overlapping generations.
The interactions between social trust, formal institutions, and other forms of social
capital such as social networks and norms may also be studied in future research. One can
imagine that when repeated dealings among players are frequent enough due to technological
reasons (such as in an agricultural society), it is benecial to establish sophisticated signaling
and type-revealing arrangements so that a persons type is more accurately observed by
others; these informal social arrangements may necessarily decline when interaction with
strangers becomes more prevalent and protable (as in an industrial economy), because
impersonal disciplinary institutions taking advantage of economies of scale are more e¤ective
in curbing defecting behaviors in a large and mobile society. Discovering the dynamic
relationship between them may contribute in important ways to our understanding of how
substantial cooperation can be achieved over time and across societies.
Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1.
In this game the probability of a player matching with a cooperative partner is believed
to be . By playing C; player i gets g if her partner is cooperative,  l if her partner defects.
So her expected payo¤ of playing C is
VC = g + (1  )(1  q)( l):
Similarly, her expected utility of playing D is
VD = (1  q)[(g + d  i) + (1  )( i)] + q( i):
Thus she will play C i¤ VC  VD, which is simplied to
i  d+ (1  )l   q((g + d  l) + l)  :
Note that when   0, all players cooperate so that  = 1, which then implies q  d=(g+d):
For the belief  to be consistent with playersstrategies, it must be true that
 = 1  F (d+ (1  )l   q((g + d  l) + l)):
The RHS is continuous in  on the closed interval [0; 1]; where RHS( = 0) = 1   F (l  
ql) > 0 and RHS( = 1) = 1   F (d   q(g + d)) < 1. Hence the existence of . Note
@RHS=@ = (l   d + q(g + d   l))@F > 0 since @F > 0 and l   d + q(g + d   l) > 0 by
assumptions (1) and (2). So the RHS crosses the 450 line from above only once, and its
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slope at the crossing point  must be smaller than one, that is, (l d+q(g+d  l))@F j < 1
holds, and hence  is stable. By the Implicit Function Theorem we have
@
@d
=   (1  q)@F j
1  (l   d+ q(g + d  l))@F j < 0;
@
@l
=   (1  )(1  q)@F j
1  (l   d+ q(g + d  l))@F j < 0;
@
@q
=
((g + d  l) + l)@F j
1  (l   d+ q(g + d))@F j > 0:
Proof for Proposition 2.
Given the belief system, seless and reciprocal players would not deviate by the same
arguments as in Proposition 1 with q = 0. At period T , playing D is the dominant strategy
for selsh players with  < d + (1   )l, so they will not deviate. If she deviates in
some period t < T by playing D, her selsh type is revealed. According to the equilibrium
strategies, (D;D) would be played in all future periods unless her partner is seless, in which
case (C;D) is played. So a selsh player who defects at period t < T   1 gets the deviation
payo¤ VD;t = (g + d   ) + (S(g + d)  )( + 2 + :::+ T t); if she defects one period
later, her payo¤ is VD;t+1 = g+ (g+ d ) + (S(g+ d) )(2+ 3+ :::+ T t), where
S = 1   F (l) is the proportion of seless players. She will deviate later if VD;t < VD;t+1,
which holds when
+ (1  S)(g + d) > d: (A1)
A player will not defect at period T   1 when (g + d  ) + S(g + d)    < g + (S +
R)(g + d)    holds, which is equivalent to
+ R(g + d) > d:
When this condition holds, (A1) is guaranteed since R  1  S :
That is, earlier defecting is less attractive when a players cooperative tendency  is
higher, when there are more reciprocal players, and when the possibility  of repeated
interactions is larger. So if a player with the minimum cooperative tendency l does not
defect at period T   1; she will not defect at any time earlier, and neither will all the other
players. Non-deviation for all players at period T   1 thus leads to (3), which guarantees
that no players deviate at any time. Since it is obvious that the belief system is fully
consistent with the strategy prole, the formal proof is omitted.
Proof for Lemma 1.
Players with   D cooperate in both games and get an income pG + (1   p)[g  
(1   )(1   q)l]. Since it does not depend on  and investing in  is costly, it is optimal
to choose the lowest possible level D. Players with  < () always defect and get an
income (1   p)(1   q)(g + d); again it is independent of ; so it is optimal to set  = 0
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to save the investment cost. A player with  2 [(); D) cooperates in the incomplete
information game, but not in the complete information game, and hence she gets an income
(1  p)[g   (1 )(1  q)l], which is lower than that with either   D or  < ().
Proof for Lemma 2.
@V (i;)=@i =  ci < 0; @V (i;)=@ = ((1  p) + c)( 0()) > 0, where
0() =  (l   d)(1  q)  qg < 0: (A2)
Proof for Proposition 3.
Since V (i;) strictly decreases in i, conditions (8) and (9) imply that there exists a
unique i() such that V (i();) = 0 for any  > 0, where
V (i();) = pG  (1  p)()  c((); i()) = 0: (A3)
This implies that for any  > 0, players with a lower index than i() will choose to
become cooperative, while the others will not; the proportion of cooperative players is thus
 = Pr(i  i()) = i() since by denition i is uniformly distributed. The best response
function of the population is thus
  B() = f i
() for  2 (0; 1]
0 for  = 0
:
It is straightforward to see that i(0) = 0. So B() is continuous in  on [0; 1]. And it
strictly increases in  since
@i()
@
=  
@V (i;)
@
@V (i;)
@i
=
((1  p) + c)[(l   d)(1  q) + qg]
ci
> 0:
Its curvature is undetermined in general, though a su¢ cient condition for strict convexity
is when c is small enough:
@2i()
@2
= [(l   d)(1  q) + qg]@((1  p) + c)=ci
@
where
@((1  p) + c)=ci
@
=
(c
0() + ci
@i()
@ )ci   ((1  p) + c)(ci0() + cii @i
()
@ )
c2i
=
 0()
ci
[(2(1  p) + c)ci
ci
+ ((1  p) + c)2 cii
c2i
  c]:
Let  2 (0; 1) denote the solution to B() = , then  is unique because B( !
0) > 0, B( = 1) < 1; and B() strictly increases in  2 (0; 1]: It is stable since the slope
of B() is smaller than one when crossing the 450 line.
To prove @=@p > 0, we show that p shifts up the best response function B() for each
 2 (0; 1] and increases 0, which is determined by
lim!0V (i = 0;) = pG  (1  p)(1  q)l   c((1  q)l; 0) = 0: (A4)
19
Accordingly, the intersection of B() with the 450 line, , must also increase with p. Based
on the equation (A3) we get
@B()
@p
=
@i()
@p
=
@V (i;)=@p
@V (i;)=@i
=
[G+ ()]
 @V (i;)=@i > 0;
Based on the equation (A4) we get
@0
@p
=  (G+ (1  q)l) ci > 0:
Similarly, from (A3) and (A4) we have
@i()
@q
=   @V (i
;)=@q
@V (i;)=@i
=
((1  p) + c)((g + d  l) + l)
 @V (i;)=@i > 0;
@0
@q
=  ((1  p) + c)l ci > 0:
The comparative statics of () are as follows.
@()
@p
= 0()
@
@p
< 0;
@()
@q
=  (g + d  l)  l + 0()@

@q
< 0:
Proof for Proposition 4
Note that 0 and 1 are determined respectively by V (0;0) = 0 and V (1;1) = 0.
It is easy to show 0 < 1. For any  2 [0;1], there exists a unique i() where
V (i();) = 0. By Lemma 2 the inequality V (1;0) < V (0;0) holds, while V (0;0) =
0 = V (1;1) by denition; so we have V (1;0) < V (1;1), which implies 0 < 1 since
V (i;) strictly increases in .
Conditions (10) and (11) imply that V (0;)  0 and V (1;)  0 for any  2 [0;1].
Since V (i;) strictly decreases in i, there exists a unique i  i() such that V (i();) =
0. From Proposition 3 we know i() is strictly increasing and convex in . It is straight-
forward to see that i(0) = 0 and i(1) = 1. The proportion of players who invest in the
cooperative tendency is thus
  B() =
8<:
0   0
i()  2 (0;1)
1   1
Following similar arguments as in Proposition 3, B() is continuous, strictly increasing and
convex in  on [0;1], B(0) = 0 and B(1) = 1; so there must exist a unique xed point
m 2 [0;1] such that B(m) = m, and hence the NE (m; m) exists, though it is not
stable since the slope of B() is bigger than one when crossing the 450 line. It is easy to
check that (0; 0) and (1; 1) are the other two NE s and both are stable.
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